Not in Model Condition - The Harsh Realities of Gieres Realism on Theoretical Knowledge
Not in Model Condition
The Harsh Realities of the Gieres Realism on Theoretical Knowledge
If asked what a theory is, the average sixth grader usually provides an answer to the effect of an educated guess or an untested answer. They would be right. However, the authority of a textbook seems beyond question. It is assumed that the information printed there went through rigorous screening and meticulous testing and re-testing and is true. Ronald Giere presents a theory that the facts of the physical sciences especially are based on approximations due to flawed assumptions. In laymans terms, scientists guess. That base is then used to construct other theories (Giere, 1988).
Literature Reviews
Ronald Gieres Models and Theories
Ronald Giere begins his argument for the flawed nature of sciences postulations by pointing out the vital importance of what is taught in the textbooks he writes that the uniformity within textbooks is based on mere theory. Physical science is not the exact science that it seems it also is colored by personal perception (Giere, 1988).
Giere proposes a return to the basics of classical mechanics, the common sense guide to forming an analytical framework for testing theories. The approach of classical mechanics is interdisciplinary and allows for a broader scope than the previous, physical sciences-based criterion for examining theory. He further describes the vague terminology as a part of the seeming validity of modern theories. After all, tests cannot disprove an entire vague and insurmountable theory- only a part of it. A large portion of his essay, Models and Theories, is dedicated to the connections between early undisputed facts and later leaps of faith disguised as indisputable scientific findings (Giere, 1988).
McMullins Galilean Idealization
McMullins main goals were exploring the idealistic techniques used and whether or not the disagreements of Galilean techniques necessitated a distance from the typical theoretical models. The Galilean idealization techniques are mathematical, construct, formal, material, causal, and subjunctive. Formal idealization supports model theory, despite the flaws. Material idealization, on the other hand, leaves a great deal to the imagination and thus is hard to test. The ability to test andor research a theory is conditional for its progression to a theory or fact (McMullin, 1985).
Causal idealization tended to be the most controversial of the six techniques and both Giere and the famed philosopher Cartwright debated the validity of the claims mostly on the grounds of their objection to this one technique. Cartwright writes that causal idealization assumes a similarity which, upon closer inspection, is not real. She writes that the claim is an attempt to bring order through glossing over differences.
Limitations of Theory
McMullins Aristotelian factors
Distrust has always played a large role in the manner that information is received. Aristotle supported the quantitative math and science and abhorred the so-called mixed sciences, such as Astronomy, but Plato soon realized that even hard sciences, such as Geometry, have their exploratory limits. McMullin defends Galileo skepticism toward natural theories of math and science as a commonly-held, Aristotelian mainstay (McMullin, 1985).
The long separation between natural philosophers and the exponents of the mixed sciences contributed to a shift a growing distrust among natural philosophers of broadly Aristotelian sympathies for those who use mathematics in the context of physical problems (McMullin, 1985).
Gieres Newtonian factors
As is the case with so many things, well-known and respected men, social and academic backers if you will, are recruited to weigh in on one side or the other. At first glance it would appear that the Newtonian laws support the widespread use of current methodologies to form theories and models in Physics. The oft-used Schroedinger equation frequently produces results which contradict themselves. If there has been no major dispute of Newtons laws and if they are regarded as fact by even the most hardened scientific skeptic, then the preeminent likelihood is that the fault lies not in the laws. The fault lies in the application (Giere, 1988).
To demonstrate this, Giere provided a poignant study for the support of this accusation. He provided studies of chess games at the highest level. Theoretically (according to the assumptions of control that Aristotle was so fond of), observance of the rules should win the day. However, these expert chess players, whose numbers of memorized game patterns reached into the tens of thousands, analyzed the patterns, instead of the rules, to win the day (Giere, 1988).
The other, real-world application involves the problem-solving processes of physicists. In order to aid a student, the physicist will usually ask for them to speak aloud their reasoning. With this bit of insight into the cognitive process of the student trying to solve the problem, the physicist-educator will quickly filter through potential processes to determine which problem-solving protocol the student is attempting to use. This is a very similar tactic to that which was used by the expert chess players in the previous example (Giere, 1988).
In the Details
Linguistic Overgeneralization
The predominant objection to Gieres essay is that of linguistic overgeneralization. Gieres descriptions of the dilemmas of model theory are vague and bring many skeletons out of the closet, many questions unanswered. The exact details are fuzzy, which is the very attribute that Giere so vehemently attacks in his own essay.
Realism Inconsistency Hypothesis
Models built upon theory are not made to stand alone but to be like an objective how-to, such as the example of representations in cognitive psychology. Textbooks are really made up of one or more cluster(s) of such models and so one error could nullify the validity of dozens of others real systems of theoretical hypotheses assert a relationship and can be proven or disproven by a true or false correlation. However, falseness of correlation does not equal failure. Thomas Edison failed a thousand times before he successfully created the light bulb, but he replied to questions with the statement that he did not fail, that he learned one thousand ways not to make a light bulb. Lack of visible product does not equal failure any more than truth of correlation equals evidentiary support. Similarities are not logical but based on similarities to presupposed truth. One example of such a truth is square earth theorys now-discredited evidence. Because of this, there is no merit in justifying questions that are irrelevant to the case at hand (Giere, 1988).
Copernican Conflict
Incorrect Copernican Theory Benefitted Future Science
Idealization in physics, though permissible on pragmatic grounds, is thus not (as the Galilean tradition has uniformly assumed) truth-producing McMullin rejoins with the claim that the end was worth the means. After all, obviously no one was hurt by the incorrect theories of Galileo and Salvati concerning gravitys resistance to the air resistance provided during the constant revolutions. In the end, this incorrect theory may have garnered more serious reflection upon- and study of- the Copernican theories regarding the shape of earth and its position within the galaxy, but undoubtedly it also set the efforts of future astronomers back by presupposing its correctness. She further implies that Simplicios accusations (that Galileos mathematical applications were falsely applied) are negligible (McMullin, 1985).
Interrelationship of models
This is a major problem with theoretical knowledge the presence of presuppositions and assumptions where they do not scientifically belong. Below is a typical diagram of a family of theoretic models. As you can plainly see, the impact of one model upon another is inexorable. If even just one accepted theory is incorrect and is used as a credible point of fact in another study, then the damage done to the realistic understanding of our world is exponentially lessened. As the old adage goes, One bad apple can ruin the bunch. As respectable as the spirit of McMullins perspectives are, there is no room for idealism in science and math. Despite the strict, objective requirements characteristic of the two disciplines, mistakes are made. Important mistakes are made, such as the Will they or Wont they removal of Pluto from among the Milky Ways planetary roster (Giere, 1988).
His criticisms of the linear oscillator are descriptive of the underlying problems. When the scientific theory assumes that a coiled wire is acting free of outside opposition of forces, such as friction and mass, they are ignoring vital factors which negatively affect accuracy in favour of a simpler mathematic equation. This may seem an acceptable sacrifice at first glance, but it is said that the wind from a butterflys wings can eventually produce catastrophe on the other side of the world. McMullin argues that it is a minuscule amount and thus worth such a risk Giere argues that underestimating the force of physical science and underestimating the product of such misunderstandings is similarly catastrophic to scientific knowledge and to the policies and approaches of tomorrow, which are based in the childhood informational textbooks (Giere, 1988 McMullin, 1985).
Both Giere and McMullin dispute the concept of knowable scientific truth. Just as Giere said, similarities do not necessarily equal truth, and that one shared dispute does not unite them in condemning the ability of incomplete or incorrect scientific truths to coexist successfully with science of weight evidentiary support. Contrarily, McMullin believed that even these disputed items could function as useful generalizations and starting points (Giere, 1988 McMullin, 1985). The extent of Gieres mistrust of scientific fact is apparent from the very first page of Models and Theories. The picture which sets the stage for his objections to the typical scientific examination moves immediately from the phase of defined concepts to empirical concepts- creating the air that the transition is trivial and absurdly brief (Giere, 1988).
Perhaps the truth is that modern people really cant handle the truth. Then again, social change has always been met with hesitance and uncertainty. There can be no risk without gain, and we have much to gain and little to lose. Our planets resources are quickly being depleted, and we base our every environmental decision upon the educated guesses of a room full of men who spend the majority of their waking hours cooped up in a lab- away from the realism of experiencing the physical sciences firsthand.
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