Philosophy

This study is mainly divided into two parts. The first part deals with the Marxist theory in relation to the falsification principle advanced by Karl Popper. Karl Popper developed a theory, which he considered to have been the ultimate criteria for the determination of knowledge as a science or vice versa. This part is aimed at establishing, whether Marxist theory can in any way satisfy the criterion for falsification that was advocated by Karl Popper. In order to effectively do this, an explanation of this term will suffice. The second part considers some of the features of science, which make it distinct as a social institution as understood by Kuhn. It goes a step further to determine whether Kuhn has overemphasized the role of crises in scientific discoveries or research. It will finally establish the difference between the revolutionary science and the normal science according to Kuhn.

Marxist Theory and Poppers Falsification Principle
Generally speaking, Marxist theory was concerned with the issues affecting society. Marxist theory was founded on the philosophy of Karl Marx, which considered the means of production as the most important of all societal concerns. The main element that characterizes Marxist theory is materialism, which was the most important element in Marx. This view was aimed at subordinating every aspect of society to the means of production. Marx argued that change was the most obvious characteristic of society. Society was, according to him, evolutionary in nature, and the evolution was caused by the trends in production means. This argument formed the basis of the Marxian prediction of the future trends. He predicted a future where the capitalist kind of government would fail due to the tensions that exist between the classes. This fall would mean that the new kind of society would be communist. In this society, the needs of all would be taken care of, so that no one would suffer want. All forms of alienation would be eliminated, and society would be guided by the spirit of care.

The question then comes is this theory capable of satisfying Poppers falsification criteria Popper was interested in finding a criterion which could be used in the distinction between science and non-science. Popper taught that the only way that a theory could be considered scientific was its capacity for falsification. In other words, unless a theory could be found to be false by means of empirical study, it could not be claimed to be scientific (Fuller, 1985). In order to effectively discuss whether Marxist theory would satisfy the Poppers criterion for science or not, one would have to consider the exact nature of Marxist theory. If a deductive argument was to be created from Marxist theory, it would be something like this all capitalist regimes are oppressive, all oppressive regimes end up in social revolution, therefore, all capitalist regimes will end up in social revolution. Now, in order to be able to determine the falsity of this argument, one would have to be present for all time, in order to establish whether this will always be the case. An examination of Marxist prediction regarding the future of society reveals that his prediction of the fall of capitalism has never really come true, at least in his expectation. In as far as this theory is concerned it seems it cannot satisfy Poppers criteria (Fuller, 1985). Marxist materialism can, however, be falsified (Fuller, 1985). This is because the claim that society is largely driven by the forces of production cannot be true of all realities of life. For instance, when one talks of morality for its own sake, there is no way to prove that this is materially oriented. For Marx, it would be impossible to talk of kindness for its own sake, because as such, it has no material motive behind it. This possibility of falsifiability makes it satisfy Poppers criteria.

Science as a Social Institution by Kuhn
According to Kuhn, science can be understood in the same way politics is understood, that is, as a social institution. This is because, according to him, there are the trends that are found in politics, which resemble science in every way. The structures of society are similar to those of scientific communities and paradigms.  Kuhn argued that when things are normal in the institution of science, just like in the other institutions, nothing really changes. The scientific paradigm in this situation is that of constancy. Things are more or less in a stagnant position. However, this status does provide for a crisis, which ends up in a change of paradigms. During this time, the theories that were characteristic of the old paradigm are somehow outlived by new theories. Kuhn further argues that only after the change in theories can a comparison be possible. If the result be in favour of the new paradigm, then the old one is discarded, otherwise, the old paradigm is retained.

This argument in Kuhn does have a point. In most cases, change is really not possible when the status remains quo. In other words, unless a paradigm is challenged, there is minimal possibility of change. However, it is not always the case that in science there must be a crisis in order for a change to take place. It has been the case that, scientific discoveries were made accidentally. For instance, the discovery of penicillin by Alexander Flemings was not the focus of his investigation. However, he realized that there was a funny behaviour in the distribution of bacteria. In this discovery, the world experienced a shift in paradigms, and the whole world was saved as a result. Kuhn has therefore overemphasized the role of crisis in scientific discoveries.

According to Kuhn, there is a difference between the revolutionary science and normal science. The revolutionary science refers to the scientific discoveries that are made during a crisis (Fuller, 1985). Normal science refers to the kind of science that remains during the times, when a paradigm is not challenged. This includes the activities of scientists with regard to a certain paradigm. This kind does not attempt to establish very major changes, rather it operates on the basis of what theories are available. This kind of science does not even question the nature of these theories as such. It is a kind of relaxed paradigm, which allows for the routine functioning of the scientists, affording even the possibility of normalcy.

The revolutionary science, according to Kuhn, is the scientific work that takes place within a crisis. This means that the opposite of the normal science is true. There is tension among the scientist as the new paradigm takes shape, just as in the political revolutions. Change is the thing that characterizes this theory. However, this understanding has its own consequences. As already mentioned, it does not always have to be in moments of crisis that fundamental change takes place (Fuller, 1985). Therefore, there are some flaws in Kuhns arguments.

The Marxist theory has been shown to have elements that are falsifiable as well as others that are not falsifiable. The prediction of the future of society has been shown to reject the criteria for falsification while the materialism in Marx admits of falsification. Kuhn, on the other hand, offers a theory of science that explains what is likely to happen in times of crisis and times of stability. However, it has been shown that there are times, when major discoveries are made, while stability is sustained. This puts the theory of Kuhn into serious question. One must hail the effort that was made by these two thinkers, but at the same time recognize that their claim to have offered guiding principles do not move beyond reasonable doubt.